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Abstract
Generic drugs comprise an increasing share of total prescriptions dispensed in the U.S., rising from nearly
50% in 1999 to 75% in 2009. The generic drug market has typically been viewed at the wholesale level as
a competitive market with price approaching marginal costs. However, the large presence of third party
payers as final purchasers may distort prices at the retail level relative to what a standard model of price
competition would predict. In this paper, we investigate how generic drug producers compete in the
presence of the procurement rules of the Medicaid program. Medicaid reimbursement to pharmacies, like
that of other payers, is based on a benchmark price called the average wholesale price (AWP). The AWP is
reported by generic producers themselves, and until recently has been subject to essentially no
independent verification. As a result, generic producers have had an incentive to compete for pharmacy
market share by reporting AWPs that exceed actual average wholesale prices, as this “spread” leads to
larger pharmacy profits. In 2000, after a federal government audit of actual wholesale prices of generic
products, states were advised to reduce Medicaid reimbursement by as much as 95% for about 400
generic and off-patent drug products. We use variation induced by the timing of this policy along with its
differential impact on drug products' Medicaid reimbursement to estimate the impact of this exogenous
price change on the market share of targeted products. Our findings indicate that pharmacies did respond
to the perverse incentives of the Medicaid program by dispensing products with the highest AWPs.
Overall, the Medicaid market share fell by about 45% for targeted drug products as a result of the policy.
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ABSTRACT
Generic drugs comprise an increasing share of total prescriptions dispensed in the U.S., rising
from nearly 50 percent in 1999 to 75 percent in 2009. The generic drug market has typically been
viewed at the wholesale level as a competitive market with price approaching marginal costs.
However, the large presence of third party payers as final purchasers may distort prices at the
retail level relative to what a standard model of price competition would predict. In this paper,
we investigate how generic drug producers compete in the presence of the procurement rules of
the Medicaid program. Medicaid reimbursement to pharmacies, like that of other payers, is based
on a benchmark price called the average wholesale price (AWP). The AWP is reported by
generic producers themselves, and until recently has been subject to essentially no independent
verification. As a result, generic producers have had an incentive to compete for pharmacy
market share by reporting AWPs that exceed actual average wholesale prices, as this “spread”
leads to larger pharmacy profits. In 2000, after a federal government audit of actual wholesale
prices of generic products, states were advised to reduce Medicaid reimbursement by as much as
95% for about 400 generic and off-patent drug products. We use variation induced by the timing
of this policy along with its differential impact on drug products’ Medicaid reimbursement to
estimate the impact of this exogenous price change on the market share of targeted products. Our
findings indicate that pharmacies did respond to the perverse incentives of the Medicaid program
by dispensing products with the highest AWPs. Overall, the Medicaid market share fell by about
45% for targeted drug products as a result of the policy.
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1. Introduction
Generic drugs comprise an increasing share of total prescriptions dispensed in the U.S.,
rising from nearly 50 percent in 1999 to 75 percent in 2009 (Berndt and Aitken, 2010). The
generic drug market has typically been viewed at the wholesale level 1 as approximately
competitive, with price approaching marginal costs. Largely as a result of this, the widespread
availability of generic drugs is generally perceived as extremely beneficial to consumers and to
those who bear the burden of paying for these treatments. However, at the retail level, generic
prices may well exceed marginal cost, even by a wide margin. One important aspect of the
generic drug market that has been largely unexplored is how drug procurement by the
government and private insurers impacts competition among generic drug manufacturers. In
particular, procurement rules may distort retail generic drug prices away from marginal cost by
perversely rewarding higher-priced generics with greater market share.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate how generic drug manufacturers
compete in the presence of the procurement rules of the Medicaid program. We examine the
impact of procurement on competition by evaluating how drug purchasing patterns responded to
a plausibly exogenous negative price shock generated by a significant government intervention.
During the period under study, Medicaid accounted for nearly 20% of all prescription drug
expenditures in the U.S. Thus, distortions in the market for drugs purchased by Medicaid have
potentially large impacts on overall drug spending, and health care spending more generally.
How might procurement distort generic competition? Consider a stylized market without
procurement. In the absence of government and private insurance, all consumers pay pharmacies
(or other generic dispensers) in cash for drugs purchased. Consumers are indifferent between
bioequivalent generic drugs that are produced by one manufacturer versus another 2, and thus
purchase the drug from the pharmacy with the lowest price. In turn, pharmacies stock and
dispense the version of the generic drug that is least costly, choosing among possibly dozens of
manufacturers. Competition among generic manufacturers for pharmacy market share, and
competition among pharmacies for consumers, drives the equilibrium price down to marginal
cost at both the wholesale and retail levels.

1

Wholesale refers to transactions between manufacturers (or wholesalers) and pharmacies and retail refers to
transactions between pharmacies and final purchasers (e.g. consumers or insurers).
2
Since generic drugs are regulated to be identical in their chemical structure and strength, a specific manufacturer is
rarely designated in a physician's written prescription for a generic drug.

2

The actual market for generic drugs differs from this textbook scenario for two main
reasons. First, there are very few cash-paying consumers in the pharmaceutical market. The last
few decades have seen a dramatic rise in prescription drug insurance coverage. The fraction of
drug spending paid for by public and private payers has grown from 34% in 1980 to nearly 80%
in 2000, and 92% in 2010 (Berndt and Aitken, 2010). Thus cash-paying consumers currently
account for only 8% of payments. Insured consumers are virtually price insensitive with respect
to choosing among different manufacturers of a generic drug, since they typically pay a copay
that is fixed across equivalent generic drugs. Consequently, consumers play little role in generic
price competition, leaving public and private payers—who account for the lion’s share of
payments to pharmacies— as the main driving force.
Second, the largest purchasers of generic drugs—public and private insurers—do not pay
pharmacies' posted prices. Government and private insurers set their own rules to determine how
much to reimburse pharmacies for drugs that they dispense. For Medicaid, like other payers,
reimbursement for each prescription has typically been based on a benchmark price called the
average wholesale price (AWP), 3 which is published in several pricing catalogues. For each
product, this list price is reported to the catalogues by generic manufacturers themselves, and
until recent years has been subject to essentially no independent verification of its resemblance to
the actual average price that pharmacies pay manufacturers to acquire drugs. As a result, generic
manufacturers have had an incentive to compete for pharmacy market share by reporting AWPs
that are much greater than average prices actually paid by pharmacies, as higher “spreads” lead
to larger pharmacy profits. Put another way, since higher AWPs generate higher reimbursement
for pharmacies, manufacturers might compete to report higher and higher AWPs in order to
induce pharmacies to stock their drug rather than a competitor's drug. This may partially explain
why differences between published and actual average prices of more than 1000% have been
uncovered in recent government audits for some generic drugs. Thus, competition among
manufacturers may increase rather than reduce the prices on which Medicaid reimbursement is
based, leading to inflated Medicaid spending.

3

A few states use the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC) or the minimum of the WAC and AWP as their
reimbursement benchmark. In 2000, the year of the policy intervention we study, Massachusetts and Rhode Island
were the only two states using the WAC as their primary reimbursement benchmark (National Pharmaceutical
Council, 2000).

3

To empirically investigate the impact of Medicaid procurement on price competition, we
examine an intervention that caused a sharp decline in price for a well-defined set of generic
drugs. In the late 1990s, an investigation by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the National
Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units (NAMFCU) “revealed a pattern of
misrepresentations by some drug manufacturers of the average wholesale prices and wholesale
acquisition costs of certain of their products.” 4 As a result of this audit, in May 2000, states were
advised to reduce the AWP used to reimburse pharmacies by as much as 95% for approximately
400 generic and off-patent injectable, infusion, and inhalation drug products. This intervention
provides a rare opportunity to study price competition because unlike other payment reforms,
such as the Medicare Modernization Act which lowered prices for all physician-administered
drugs (which are covered by Medicare Part B), this policy differentially lowered price for only a
select set of drugs within classes of bioequivalent products. Thus we can compare changes in
pharmacy purchases before and after the price change for targeted generic drugs and their
bioequivalent competitors to estimate pharmacy demand responses and infer manufacturers’
pricing behavior. For example, in the market for Acetylcysteine, the DOJ recommended that
Medicaid lower the AWP to the audited price for several products produced by three
manufacturers, but did not make any price recommendations for the other seven manufacturers
of this drug. Finding shifts in purchases away from targeted drugs towards their competitors as
the relative price of targeted drugs declined would be evidence that pharmacies respond to the
perverse incentives of the Medicaid program by stocking products with relatively high AWPs.
Using more than a decade of Medicaid State Drug Utilization Data from the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), we demonstrate that actual reimbursement per
prescription purchased declined substantially for targeted drugs following the 2000 DOJ
recommendations, relative to competitor products whose AWPs were not targeted by the DOJ.
We also find evidence of a decline in the number of targeted drug prescriptions dispensed to
Medicaid patients by pharmacies and an increase in the number of competitor drugs dispensed.
Overall, the market share, measured in terms of Medicaid prescriptions dispensed, for targeted
drugs fell by about 45% through 2004, implying that pharmacies substituted away from drug
products whose prices were reduced.

4

Office of the Attorney General, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, State of New York, 2000.
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In general, our results show that pharmacies respond to the incentives inherent in AWPbased reimbursement by dispensing drugs in a manner consistent with profit-maximizing
behavior, but inconsistent with a standard model of price competition in which lower-priced
drugs capture higher market share. Medicaid procurement incentives have led at least some
generic manufacturers to compete by (sometimes vastly) overstating AWPs, which can markedly
reduce the cost savings to consumers or insurers from using generic drugs.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides detailed background
about the AWP and related literature. Section 3 discusses the DOJ intervention. Section 4
describes the data and sample restrictions. Section 5 outlines the empirical framework and
presents the descriptive statistics and results. Section 6 concludes.

2. Background
2.1. AWP Basics
AWP-based reimbursement was first introduced by California's Medicaid program in
1969, at a time when public and private insurers were just beginning to pay for prescription
drugs (insurers accounted for only 15% of total drug spending in that year). 5 Its predecessor,
“cost-based” reimbursement, reimbursed pharmacies the exact amount they were charged by
manufacturers to purchase the drug plus a fixed dispensing fee to cover labor and capital costs.
This method led to a multitude of reimbursement amounts for identical products. More
importantly, since pharmacies would receive the same (zero) profit margin from reimbursement
regardless of their acquisition costs, drug manufacturers could in turn set high prices without
reducing pharmacies' demand for their product.
In contrast, the AWP approach provided an opportunity for pharmacies to profit from
Medicaid reimbursement through the existence of a “spread.” The spread is the difference
between the reimbursement amount (which is computed as a fixed proportion of each drug's
AWP) and the pharmacy's actual acquisition costs. A positive (negative) spread is a profit (loss)
for the pharmacy. Policymakers anticipated that pharmacies would seek to maximize this spread
by searching for the lowest priced versions of generic drugs. In turn, this in theory would induce
price competition among manufacturers, which would thereby allow Medicaid to lower their
reimbursement amounts over time. Other states and private insurers soon adopted California's
5

Calculations from CMS National Health Accounts (2011).

5

model and publishers such as the Red Book, Blue Book, Medi-Span, and First Data Bank,
entered the market to meet the demand for data on average wholesale prices. (See for example,
Kolassa, 1994; Kolassa, 1997; Berndt and Newhouse, 2012; and Danzon et al., 2005; for a more
detailed summary of the history of the AWP).
A typical AWP-based reimbursement rule used by public and private payers is defined as
follows. For each drug product dispensed to a recipient of insurance type , the pharmacy
receives a reimbursement amount equal to 6:
(1)
Where

Thus, a pharmacy earns a profit of

, where

is the acquisition cost of drug from the manufacturer.
Given that

and the dispensing fee are fixed across drugs, the

and

are the

crucial factors governing whether pharmacies choose to stock one generic version over another.
In pricing catalogues, the AWP is reported for each drug at the level of the National Drug Code
(NDC). The NDC is a unique eleven-digit identification number assigned by the FDA to every
drug product distributed in the U.S. The first 5 digits uniquely identify the manufacturer, the next
4 digits identify the product code (which include the strength, dosage form, and formulation of
the drug), and the final 2 digits identify the package size and type. Thus a single NDC code
uniquely defines one drug produced by one particular manufacturer and is denoted by in the
equation above. In the case of generic drugs, the NDC can distinguish between identical,
bioequivalent drugs that are produced by different manufacturers because each version will have
a unique NDC.
For the Medicaid program, there are a few additional caveats regarding the parameters of
the reimbursement rule. First,

may vary across brand name and generic drugs (the former is

typically smaller). 7 Second, the AWP is sometimes replaced by a lower, government-determined
price for certain generic drugs. These prices are known as the Federal Upper Limit (FUL) or the
Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC). FULs, which were first established by the federal

6

This rule generates what is known as the “Estimated Acquisition Cost” (EAC) and reimbursement is based on the
minimum of the EAC or “Usual and Customary Charge” (U&C).
7
See, for example, state Medicaid reimbursement rules available on CMS website:
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Benefits/Prescription-Drugs/StatePrescription-Drug-Resources.html

6

government in 1987, denote the maximum price at which the Medicaid program will reimburse
pharmacies for certain drugs. Generic drugs that have three or more manufacturers are frequently
subject to these limits, which have been traditionally set at 150 percent of the lowest published
AWP among all equivalent versions of the drug (KFF, 2002). Over 200 drugs were on the FUL
list during the study period (OIG, 2001), though reports by the OIG suggest that not all eligible
generic drugs receive FULs (OIG, 2004a, 2004b). MACs are similar to reimbursement limits for
generic drugs that are set by each individual state's Medicaid program. These limits tend to be
wider in scope and are more aggressive than FULs (Abramson, 2004). Third, there is also
variation in the

and the dispensing fee across states: the Medicaid

ranged from 0.05 to 0.15

across states during the period under study (NPC, 2000). 8 To the extent that any of these
mechanisms do restrain prices, our results are net of these disciplinary devices.

2.2. The AWP and Medicaid Procurement Incentives
In the previous section we outlined the two main parameters governing transactions
and

between payers, pharmacies, and manufacturers (

). In this section we briefly

discuss how manipulation of the AWP can lead to a perverse form of price competition in which
manufacturers compete to offer pharmacies the highest-priced version of a generic drug. We
focus on the Medicaid program, but an analogous discussion can be applied to other payers
including private insurers.
First, recall that pharmacies earn a profit from Medicaid reimbursement if it generates a
positive “spread”-- that is, the reimbursement (which is proportional to the
cost that pharmacies pay to acquire the drug from the manufacturer

) exceeds the

. Thus, when choosing

among bioequivalent NDCs, pharmacies prefer to stock the NDC that generates the largest
spread. In turn, manufacturers have an incentive to compete for pharmacy market share by
and

offering the largest possible spread between
and bidding down the

. They can do so by bidding up the

.

8

CMS also requires that drug manufacturers pay rebates to pharmacies. For generic and off-patent brand name
drugs, the rebate is calculated as 13 percent of AMP in 2013 (Section 2501(b) of the Affordable Care Act). Specific
states may have yet other mechanisms in place, such as formularies, that go at least some way toward restraining
Medicaid reimbursement of generic drugs.

7

While it may have been the original intent of Medicaid's reimbursement policy that the
AWP reflect an average of the actual prices that pharmacies pay manufacturers or wholesalers to
acquire the drug, in practice, manufacturers self-report the

to the pricing catalogues. These

self-reports are not subject to any independent verification (GAO, 2002). Consequently, as the
GAO (2002) explains, the Average Wholesale Price “is neither an average nor a price that
wholesalers charge...it is a number that manufacturers derive using their own criteria; there are
no requirements or conventions that AWP reflect the price of any actual sale of drugs by a
manufacturer.” Thus, since this price can be easily manipulated, manufacturers have an incentive
to compete for pharmacy market share by simply reporting higher and higher AWPs. 9
In the presence of AWP-based Medicaid reimbursement rules, we would expect there to
be a positive spread in equilibrium. A spread of zero (
manufacturer sets an

such that

) is not sustainable, since if one

, then another firm can report

and capture the entire market, all else equal. Similarly, one manufacturer could
set

<

with a similar outcome. Thus, manufacturers may bid up the AWP and bid down

to marginal costs. In other words, Medicaid reimbursement policies provide an incentive for
manufacturers to compete on the pharmacy’s profit margin, rather than on simply the acquisition
price as a text book model of Bertrand price competition might predict. While this type of
manufacturer competition may lead to close to marginal cost pricing in transactions between
pharmacies and manufacturers (as described in, e.g., Berndt and Newhouse, 2012; Berndt. et al.,
2011; Ching, 2010; Reiffen and Ward, 2005; Grabowski and Vernon, 1992), it may generate
prices greatly exceeding marginal costs in transactions between pharmacies and purchasers (such
as Medicaid and other private payers). 10 Evidence from numerous audits of actual spreads
discussed below supports the prediction that the AWP will be inflated for generic drugs (e.g.
CBO, 2004; GAO, 2001; OIG, 2002). Consequently, while the widespread availability of
generic drugs is still largely perceived as unambiguously beneficial to consumers and payers, the

9

If the AWP reflected an average of the actual prices that pharmacies pay wholesalers, then increasing actual
wholesale prices requires that the manufacturer trade off the gain from additional Medicaid purchases against the
loss of purchases from other payers. In cases where Medicaid payments are a small share of sales, manufacturers
rather than bidding up the
.
may find it profit-maximizing to compete by bidding down the
10
The threat of attracting regulatory attention presumably deters manufacturers from inflating the AWP to infinitely
high levels.

8

cost savings from these drugs may be substantially overstated if the incentives of the
reimbursement system lead manufacturers to report inflated AWPs for many drugs. 11

2.3. Evidence of the Spread and Related Literature
Numerous studies conducted by government agencies (e.g. CBO, 2004; GAO, 2001;
OIG, 2002) have uncovered large spreads for brand and generic drugs which are consistent with
the hypothesis outlined in section 2.2 above. In one particularly striking study, the Office of
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services (2002) conducted an audit of
approximately 200 randomly selected pharmacies in eight states to obtain 8,728 invoice prices
for prescription drugs. The authors found that on average pharmacies' actual drug acquisition
price was 83% of the published AWP for brand name drugs, 56% of the AWP for generic drugs
without an FUL, and 28% of the AWP for drugs with an FUL. It is interesting to note that the
AWP was more inflated for generic drugs than brands 12, and even drugs subject to FULs
(typically the least concentrated markets with 3 or more manufacturers) had substantially inflated
AWPs. If pharmacies' demand responds positively to the spread, increasing levels of
competition among manufacturers could lead to increases in Medicaid drug spending.
In related studies, government audits have also uncovered large profit margins for
physician-administered drugs (e.g. chemotherapy) under reimbursement rules for Medicare Part
B. Before the Medicare Modernization Act was implemented in 2005, Medicare drug
reimbursement to physicians was based on the same AWP-based payment rule as in the
Medicaid program. 13 In one Government Accountability Office audit (2001), physician’s
average acquisition prices ranged from 66% to 87% of the AWP for a sample of the highest
volume physician-administered drugs. Some oncology drugs could be purchased by physicians
for as low as 15% of the AWP. Since physicians can substitute between therapeutically similar
treatments for patients (brand and generic drugs alike), manufacturers of oncology drugs

11

The retail market for generics also may not be fully competitive for reasons beyond AWP pricing. Berndt and
Newhouse (2012) and Berndt et al., 2011, note that market power of certain retail pharmacies and pharmacy benefit
managers may serve to restrain price competition at the retail level.
12
The smaller spreads for brands relative to generics may also help accelerate the use of generic drugs, since
pharmacies may earn greater profits from generic drugs than from branded drugs.
13
Shea, et al. 2008 and Jacobson, et al. 2010 find that Medicare Part B’s switch from AWP to ASP resulted in
changes in chemotherapy treatment patterns, but no reduction in the likelihood of treatment or wait times for the
drugs included in the studies.

9

compete for physician market share in an analogous way that manufacturers of generic drugs
compete for pharmacy market share.
While the issue of AWP inflation has received considerable attention in government
reports and a series of recent lawsuits filed by CMS, it has not been explored in the academic
literature. The most similar study to the present one is Duggan and Scott-Morton (2006) which
examines the impact of Medicaid procurement on prices for brand name drugs. 14 However, in
contrast to that paper, we focus on generic drugs. The case for generics differs from the case for
brands because Medicaid procurement distorts generic prices through its impact on pharmacy
purchasing incentives. Pharmacies play an important and often overlooked role in driving price
competition among multiple source drugs, yet relative to hospitals, physicians, nursing homes,
and other providers, pharmacy behavior has received very little attention in the health economics
literature. While pharmacies cannot automatically substitute between different brand name
drugs, they may choose among potentially dozens of suppliers to determine which version of a
generic drug to stock and dispense. Thus, generic manufacturers compete for pharmacy market
share, whereas brand manufacturers compete for consumers and physicians who influence how
prescriptions are written.
A second related literature examines the impact of reimbursement rules more broadly on
real (e.g. Gruber et al, 1999) and nominal (e.g. Dafny, 2005) health care utilization. This large
literature documents evidence from many contexts of substitution by providers towards
procedures and services that are more generously reimbursed. For example, Gruber et al. (1999)
shows that variation in the Medicaid reimbursement differential between Cesarean and normal
childbirth across states leads to an increased rate of Cesarean births in states with larger
reimbursement differentials. Dafny (2005) finds that differentials in Medicare reimbursement by
the severity of diagnosis lead hospitals to falsely recode patients' diagnoses to the most
profitable, high severity codes. While reimbursement differentials that distort actual treatment
decisions could potentially have negative health consequences, distortions in simply the choice
of manufacturers for generic drugs will not affect health. In this sense, our study is more similar
to Dafny (2005) in that reimbursement distortions lead to higher public spending.
14

In another related study, Brekke, Holmas, and Straume (2011) examine the effects of drug procurement policies in
Norway on price competition between off-patent brand name and generic drugs. In a similar spirit to this paper,
their empirical approach exploits quasi-experimental variation in the impact of a policy change across drug products
to study the effects of reference pricing on prices and market shares.

10

2.4. Policy Significance
Despite the perverse incentives of AWP-based reimbursement (and its potential for
increasing drug spending), the AWP has been the dominant insurer reimbursement benchmark
for over four decades, and it is still the primary benchmark for the majority of state Medicaid
programs and many private insurers. As of the first quarter of 2013, 29 states still used the AWP
as the benchmark price in setting Medicaid drug reimbursements, and 16 others used the WAC
which is closely related to the AWP (CMS, 2013). The issue of AWP inflation has attracted
considerable attention from government agencies and policymakers in recent years. While no
policies have yet been put into place to fully replace the AWP, Medicaid has implemented
several piecemeal interventions to mitigate AWP inflation, and it is possible that wholesale
changes to the program will be implemented in the near future.
First, federal and state governments have introduced maximum limits on Medicaid
reimbursement, known as FULs or MACs, for select generic and off-patent drugs. During the
approximate midpoint of our study period, FULs covered over 200 drugs (OIG, 2001).

15

For

drugs subject to FULs, the reimbursement limit has been traditionally set as 150% of the lowest
published price (e.g. AWP) within a group of equivalent drugs (KFF, 2002). 16

However, under

this rule, manufacturers still have an incentive to self-report higher prices to drive up the
minimum price and, consequently, the FUL. Thus, these limits may not be effective at reducing
reimbursement for covered drugs. In 2012, an audit by the Office of the Inspector General found
that FULs based on published list prices were on average more than four times greater than
actual acquisition costs (OIG, 2012).
Second, in 2005, the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) legislated replacing the AWP with
another payment benchmark called the Average Manufacturer Price (AMP). However, the
provisions of the DRA were never implemented because pharmacy trade groups obtained a
federal court injunction to prevent the publication and use of the AMP in reimbursement due to

15

Typically, multi-source drugs with three or more suppliers are eligible for FULs, however reports by the Office of
the Inspector General (OIG, 2004a, 2004b) have found that many eligible drug groups do not receive FULs.
16
The Affordable Care Act legislated a new benchmark for the FUL which was set to be 175% of the weighted
average of the Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) as of October 2010. However, CMS has not yet implemented
this new FUL benchmark, and as of August 2012 FULs were still based on published list prices such as the AWP
(OIG, 2012).
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concern that this data-- which manufacturers currently report to Medicaid for use in its drug
rebate program-- does not accurately reflect pharmacy prices (NASMD, 2010).
Third, state Medicaid programs, Medicare, and private insurers have recently filed a
series of lawsuits alleging that drug manufacturers have reported inflated AWPs to pricing
catalogues. In one example in 2010, three drug manufacturers Abbott Laboratories, Roxane
Laboratories, and B. Braun Medical, faced a $421 million settlement for having “engaged in a
scheme to report false and inflated prices for numerous pharmaceutical products knowing that
federal healthcare programs relied on those reported prices to set payment rates (DOJ, 2010).”
The Department of Justice reports that over $2 billion in settlements has been recovered to date
by Medicaid and Medicare from drug manufacturers who have manipulated the AWP (DOJ,
2012).
Fourth, in another set of lawsuits, the publishers of pricing data themselves have been
targeted for fraudulent practices. First Data Bank (a major supplier of AWP data to Medicaid)
stopped publishing the AWP in September of 2011 as a result of a major lawsuit against the
publisher (OIG, 2011). According to a report by the OIG (2011), the 45 states using the AWP as
of early 2011 planned to respond to this change by 1) requesting AWP data from other publishers
(10 states), 2) using the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC) as the benchmark instead of the
AWP (12 states), 3) collecting data on average acquisition costs (3 states), or 4) had no transition
plan in place (20 states). 17 The WAC, which has been the most popular alternative to the AWP,
is also a manufacturer self-reported price and “in many instances it is currently the basis upon
which the AWP is calculated (NASMD, 2010),” thus generating the same perverse reporting
incentives and susceptibility for price inflation as the AWP.
Fifth, in a proposed rule issued by CMS in February 2012, which is currently set to
become final in August 2013, the agency proposes to shift away from reimbursement based on
“estimated acquisition cost” (EAC) to reimbursement based on “actual acquisition cost” (AAC).
Under this new definition, states would be required to provide data to support that their
reimbursement methodology is representative of AAC. The proposed rule as written does not
explicitly state how the AAC is to be calculated, but it suggests that states could use “a national
survey, to create a database of actual acquisition costs…state survey of retail pharmacy
17

Three states intended to continue using the AWP but haven’t selected an alternative publisher, 3 considered
replacing the AWP with the WAC, 6 intended to discontinue the AWP but haven’t taken steps to select a new
benchmark, 8 had not decided whether they would continue AWP from another source or switch to WAC.
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providers… [or] alternatively, the use of an AMP ” to determine reimbursement rates. 18
Meanwhile, over the last two years, CMS has begun fielding a survey of retail pharmacies’
acquisition prices to compute a new national benchmark, known as the National Average Drug
Acquisition Cost (NADAC). CMS says that it “expect[s] that states may consider the NADAC
as a reference price when setting their reimbursement methodology,” 19
The future of Medicaid drug reimbursement continues to be a highly contested policy
issue. With future expansions in Medicaid enrollment under the Affordable Care Act, reducing
excessive prescription drug spending is likely to become an even more critical issue in the near
term. Even if and when the AWP is phased-out, alternative Medicaid reimbursement
benchmarks such as the WAC, AMP NADAC, and others may generate similarly distortionary
incentives as the AWP. Indeed, as is clear from the proposed CMS rule and resulting
stakeholder comments, and from discussions of potential policy remedies (NASMD, 2010),
designing feasible and sensible alternatives to these benchmarks is not straightforward. 20 In this
paper we estimate pharmacy and manufacturer responses to the AWP. Understanding the effects
of AWP-based reimbursement on the pharmaceutical market is an important first step in
evaluating policy alternatives that may generate similar perverse incentives. To the best of our
knowledge, this issue has not been systematically explored previously.

3. Intervention
3.1. Details of the DOJ Intervention
This study focuses on a national investigation of AWPs by the DOJ and NAMFCU in the
late 1990s. The agencies collected actual wholesale pricing data from wholesalers' catalogues
which “revealed a pattern of misrepresentations by some drug manufacturers of the average
wholesale prices and wholesale acquisition costs of certain of their products.” The actual
18

The proposed rule is 42 CFR 447.518, as documented in: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-0202/html/2012-2014.htm, and listed as
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201210&RIN=0938-AQ41, both accessed on
6/19/2013.
19
For details on the NADAC see: http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Benefits/Prescription-Drugs/Survey-of-Retail-Prices.html accessed on 6/19/2013.
20
For example, the NADAC, which aims to measure acquisition prices more reliably than AWP, is derived from a
voluntary survey of retail pharmacies. It therefore may not be representative of the universe of acquisition prices.
Moreover, it excludes from its calculation discounts or rebates that are not listed on invoices. AMPs are prices
charged by manufacturers, not paid by retail pharmacies, so they do not factor in wholesale markups.
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wholesale prices were substantially lower than published AWPs. In an effort “to ensure that
Medicaid drug prices are based on true information,” NAMFCU sent a letter in February 2000 to
all state Medicaid pharmacy directors notifying them of the misrepresentations. 21 Beginning on
May 1, 2000, First Data Bank provided states with revised AWPs based on the pricing data
uncovered in this investigation for approximately 400 NDCs representing about 50 drug
products. 22 States were strongly encouraged by NAMFCU to use these revised AWPs in place
of the published AWPs in calculating reimbursements for these drugs.
The 400 NDCs represent about 50 unique drugs and accounted for $306 million of
Medicaid spending in 1999. 23 These drugs are all generic and off-patent injectable, infusion, and
inhalation products, including about a dozen oncology drugs and blood clotting factors. The full
list of drugs targeted by the DOJ is reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The extent to which
the AWP had been inflated for these drugs is staggering. The interquartile range of published
AWPs 24 relative to actual wholesale prices is 2.4 to 36.3 (for the median, the published AWP is 6
times the actual price). For example, in one case, a manufacturer had reported an AWP of
$948.46 for a pack of 2 ml vials of the generic antibiotic Amikacin Sulfate, while the
investigation found that the actual wholesale price was only $125.00. Similarly large margins
between the published AWP and the average wholesale price uncovered by the DOJ can be
found for other drugs as shown in Table 1.
While all states received the recommendation to adopt the AWP revisions, the use of
these new prices was voluntary. A survey conducted by the Office of the Inspector General
(2001) found that as of January-March 2001, 30 states had incorporated some or all of the
revised AWPs into their reimbursements to pharmacies. 25 The remaining states continued to be
supplied with the original, manufacturer-reported AWPs from First Data Bank. States that did
not adopt the revisions expressed concern that the new prices were too low, potentially

21

For example, see Office of the Attorney General, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, State of New York, 2000.
It was also indicated that First Data Bank would update the prices for the 400 NDCs from data from actual
wholesale catalogs every 6 months. However, some states reported concern that First Data Bank would not update
the prices unless the DOJ and NAMFCU continued to provide them with wholesale catalogue prices (OIG, 2001).
23
This figure is calculated by the authors using Medicaid State Drug Utilization Data for all states except Arizona.
Arizona is the only state that does not participate in the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program and therefore does not
report drug utilization data to CMS.
24
We compare the actual wholesale prices uncovered in the DOJ investigation (HHS, 2000) with the AWPs
published in the 1999 Red Book.
25
The states that adopted the revisions as of 2001 are: AK, CT, DC, DE, FL, HI, ID, IL, IN, KS, KY, MD, MN,
MO, MT, ND, NH, NJ, NM, NV, NY, OK, OR, PA, SC, UT, VT, WA, WI, WV.
22
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compromising beneficiaries' access to these drugs (OIG, 2001). It is worth noting that states that
had not adopted the revisions at the time of the survey may have decided to adopt them later or,
in any case, adopted them in a de facto manner when catalogues stopped publishing the
manufacturer-reported AWPs for targeted drugs in later years. 26 Conversely, some early adopter
states may have eventually discontinued the use of the AWP revisions. 27
This intervention provides a “quasi-experiment” to study the impact of Medicaid
procurement on price competition for generic drugs. It generated a large and sudden reduction in
the price on which Medicaid reimbursement is based for a select set of NDCs within classes of
bioequivalent products. Prices for the bioequivalent competitors of targeted NDCs were not
directly affected by the DOJ intervention. That said, the competitors are not a set of pure
“control” NDCs because although they were not singled out in the DOJ audit, the DOJ
intervention may have changed the nature of AWP reporting itself. It is possible that after the
DOJ announcement, drug manufacturers may have become more cautious in reporting highly
inflated AWPs that might draw attention from regulators or litigators. To the extent that we see
an effect on prescriptions and market shares for targeted drugs relative to competitor drugs, this
should represent a downward biased estimate of the effect of the intervention. It should be noted
that the intervention may also have led to changes in the actual acquisition price paid by
pharmacies for the drugs. Unfortunately, we do not have acquisition price data and cannot
investigate whether those prices changed in response to the intervention.
For the approximately 50 “treated” drug markets, we examine how the pharmacy market
share for targeted NDCs changed following the reduction in the relative price of these drugs. We
proxy for pharmacy market share using Medicaid utilization. 28 Appendix Figure A.1 illustrates
this “experiment” for one drug market, Acetylcysteine. In this market, only select NDCs of
Acetylcysteine produced by the manufacturer Abbott were targeted by the DOJ (the large
quantity packages), all Acetylcysteine NDCs produced by Faulding were targeted, and no
26

For instance, the Red Book began to publish revised AWPs for some of the targeted NDCs in 2002.
Finally, even among states that adopted the revisions, not all revised prices for targeted drugs were implemented.
For example, some hemophilia groups claimed that treatment would be discontinued if prices were not increased,
leading some states to exclude blood clotting factors from the revisions (OIG, 2001).
28
Recall that the consumers should be price insensitive across bioequivalent generics produced by different
manufacturers. Thus shifts in utilization from one manufacturer's version to another's version reflect changes in the
purchasing patterns of pharmacies. Further, while Medicaid outpatient drug utilization corresponds one-to-one with
pharmacy dispensing, our data will not capture changes in the total number of drugs purchased and stocked by
pharmacies. We are unaware of any national-level dataset that would provide this level of detail on pharmacy
purchasing.
27
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Acetylcysteine NDCs produced by Bedford were targeted. Since these targeted and nontargeted products are bioequivalent substitutes, we can test the effect of the differential price
shock for targeted NDCs on their market share. As shown in the figure, the market share (as
measured by prescriptions dispensed) of targeted Acetylcysteine NDCs plummeted after states
adopted the DOJ prices.
Following the discussion in Section 2, we predict that the incentives embedded in
Medicaid procurement rules should induce pharmacies to substitute away from the drugs that
experienced the price reduction and towards their competitors' products, leading to a decline in
the market share for targeted drugs. This contrasts with a standard model of price competition in
which the price decline would be predicted to cause an increase in pharmacy market share.
Consequently, if pharmacies reward higher-priced drugs with greater market share, this provides
an incentive for manufacturers to compete by bidding up the published price.

4. Data Sources
4.1. Data
The main source of data for this paper is the Medicaid State Drug Utilization Data
published by CMS. 29 The data series tracks Medicaid spending and utilization by NDC for each
state and quarter from 1991 through the present. NDCs only appear in the data if they have nonzero Medicaid utilization in the state and quarter. We aggregate the quarterly data to annual
totals. 30 We focus primarily on two variables: the number of prescriptions and the total
reimbursement. From this we construct reimbursement per prescription and the market share for
targeted drugs. Given that Medicaid reimbursement is largely determined by the AWP,
reimbursement per prescription and AWP should be strongly correlated. The data set also
includes information about NDC characteristics such as the drug name, FDA approval date,
whether it is a generic or brand name drug, and the unit type (e.g. capsule, tablet, milliliter).
We obtained the list of 411 NDCs that were targeted by the DOJ from a Program
Memorandum issued by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS, 2000). 31 This
29

State Drug Utilization Data which is collected for the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program is available from the CMS
website: https://www.cms.gov/MedicaidDrugRebateProgram/SDUD/list.asp
30
The quarterly data are highly noisy. This variation may reflect when claims are processed rather than actual
patterns in drug use.
31
This memorandum was issued to notify the Medicare program of the alternative source of average wholesale data
that was uncovered by the DOJ and NAMFCU for the Medicaid program.
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document contains the actual average wholesale price found in the DOJ audit for each NDC. We
use the eleven-digit NDCs reported in this Memorandum to identify the targeted NDCs in the
State Drug Utilization Data. We find that 379 of the 411 NDCs had non-zero Medicaid
utilization the year before the intervention.
In this study, we compare changes in purchasing patterns for the targeted NDCs and their
competitors whose prices were not directly revised by the DOJ. To identify a set of competitor
drugs, we begin by identifying for each targeted NDC the set of drugs that share the same active
ingredients as the targeted NDC. In choosing which drugs to stock and dispense, pharmacies
may substitute between one generic and another (or a generic and an off-patent brand name
drug) 32 if they are bioequivalent. NDCs are bioequivalent if all of the following are true: the
NDCs share the same active ingredient name, strength, and therapeutic equivalence rating as
reported in the FDA publication, “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations” (also known as the Orange Book).
Thus, the analysis sample includes the approximately 400 NDCs that received revised
AWPs and all other NDCs (generics and off-patent brands) that have the same active ingredient
names as those in the revised group. We use the drug name variable to extract these NDCs from
the State Drug Utilization Data. 33 For generic drugs, the drug name is the same as the active
ingredient name. For off-patent brand name drugs (both active and discontinued), we use the
Orange Book 34 to obtain the list of brand names that have the same active ingredient name as the
targeted NDCs. Using this market definition, there are 379 targeted NDCs and 2,839 competitor
NDCs with positive Medicaid utilization in 1999. While this market definition is somewhat
broader than generic bioequivalence, it allows us to capture possible substitutions across
different formulations of a generic drug if pharmacists seek permission from the prescribing
physicians to make these substitutions. 35

32

This sometimes requires permission from the prescribing doctor, but is at the discretion of the pharmacy in states
with mandatory generic substitution laws.
33
This process is aided by linking the utilization data by NDC code to CMS's Drug Product File in order to
determine the full name of each drug product. In the full US sample, the Drug Product File can be linked to about
55% of the NDCs in the utilization data. For NDCs that are not matched with a full drug name, we use the
abbreviated drug name that appears in the utilization data.
34
The FDA Orange Book is available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm
35
For example, a pharmacy might respond to the DOJ intervention by stocking only the formulations of a generic
drug which are most profitable (e.g. liquid version vs. tablet, or a specific concentration). Patients who receive a
prescription for a formulation of a drug that is not stocked by the pharmacy may be induced by the pharmacy to
switch to a different formulation with permission from their doctor.
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4.2. Sample Restrictions
We restrict our analysis to the period from 1994-2004, since changes in the composition
of drugs over time make data further away from the intervention year less comparable. Our
initial sample is constructed at the NDC-by-state-by-year level and includes 795,694
observations. We make three other sample restrictions. First, we exclude five states from the
analysis: Arizona, Alabama, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas. Arizona does not report drug
utilization data to CMS because it does not participate in the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program.
The other four states do not use AWP as their primary reimbursement methodology (OIG, 2001).
This reduces the sample by 66,190 observations. Second, we drop NDCs for hemophilia drugs
(Anti-Inhibitor Coagulant Complex, Factor VIII, Factor IX). Hemophilia patient groups opposed
the DOJ recommended prices leading many states to implement alternative prices for these drugs
(OIG, 2001). These three biological drugs are also unusually expensive relative to the other
drugs targeted by the DOJ. They have the highest average reimbursement per prescription among
drugs in the sample, ranging from $10,493 to $16,369 per prescription in 1999. 36 Removing
these drugs from the sample reduces total reimbursement by 15.59% and total prescriptions by
only 0.04%. Finally we exclude 5 observations that are extreme outliers in reimbursement per
prescription, which are likely reporting errors. 37
The final NDC-by-state-by-year sample includes 723,991 observations. Since the
intervention occurred at the NDC level, we aggregate the data across states to form nationwide
totals for each NDC (though later differentiate between states that adopted the DOJ prices early
versus other states). There are 32,203 NDC-by-year observations in the final analysis sample.

5. Empirical Evidence of Reverse Price Competition
5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Graphical Evidence
We begin by presenting descriptive statistics and trends for reimbursement and
prescriptions purchased. Much of the evidence for the intervention effect can be seen in the raw
means and graphically. In Table 2, descriptive statistics are reported separately for NDCs that
36

For comparison, Winrho SDF, which was the next most expensive drug in the sample, has a mean reimbursement
per prescription of $2,080 which is substantially lower than the cost of the hemophilia drugs.
37
We remove the following outlier observations because they differ substantially from the same NDCs in other
states and years: NDC=00074115170, ME, 1996; NDC=59075065220, WA, 2003; NDC=39769001101, IL, 1991;
NDC=49669162301, AR, 2002; NDC=00026064920, VA, 1999.
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were targeted in the DOJ investigation and for their bioequivalent competitors. Means of
variables are presented for units aggregated at the NDC level, except for the drug group market
share variable, which is aggregated at the “drug group” level (i.e. the class of drugs that share the
same drug name). The means are shown for 1999 and the change between 1999 and 2002.
Columns 1 and 2 reveal that the DOJ-targeted NDCs were on average about 3 times more
expensive than their bioequivalent competitor NDCs in 1999. The targeted NDCs were also
Medicaid market leaders with an average market share that was more than 5 times as large as
their competitors' market shares. However, since there were fewer targeted NDCs, they made up
a smaller share of the overall market. Targeted drugs were also much more likely to have a liquid
formulation than competitor drugs, which may explain some of the price differential.
We first show suggestive evidence that pharmacies may have shifted away from
purchasing targeted drugs following the intervention. The data show a decline in both mean
Medicaid reimbursement per prescription and the number of prescriptions dispensed for targeted
NDCs from 1999 to 2002, coinciding with the timing of the DOJ intervention. In the same time
period, reimbursements per prescription and sales increased for competitor NDCs.
We further examine whether the 1999-2002 change in reimbursement and prescriptions
varied across competitor drugs depending on whether or not their manufacturer was targeted by
the DOJ for other NDCs within the same drug class. We might expect that competitor NDCs
produced by targeted manufacturers would respond differently to the intervention for a few
reasons. First, because these manufacturers were under increased scrutiny by the DOJ, they may
have halted price growth or even lowered prices on non-targeted products in attempt to avoid
further investigation. Second, targeted manufacturers may have been able to more readily switch
marketing and production efforts between their targeted and non-targeted products within a drug
group, leading to a large observed increase in non-targeted “competitor” products. On the other
hand, this effect would be mitigated if pharmacies were reluctant to purchase non-targeted
products from the manufacturers who were under the most scrutiny.
Columns 3 and 4 report means for competitor NDCs produced by targeted and nontargeted manufacturers. Competitor NDCs produced by targeted firms are very similar to
targeted NDCs (Column 1) in terms of observable characteristics, such as baseline
reimbursement per prescription and unit type. Moreover, similar to targeted NDCs, competitor
NDCs of targeted firms saw a small decline in their average reimbursement following the
19

intervention. In contrast, reimbursement per prescription increased by 25 percent for competitor
NDCs of non-targeted firms. NDCs from non-targeted firms also experienced substantially larger
growth in the average number of prescriptions purchased relative to competitor NDCs from
targeted firms (a 56% versus 0.5% increase). While the means presented in this table are
consistent with the hypothesized effects of the DOJ intervention, the changes in outcomes from
1999-2002 may also reflect differences in longer-term trends across targeted and competitor
NDCs.
Figure 1 documents how reimbursement per prescription, prescription purchases, and
market share evolved from 1991 through 2004 for targeted and competitor NDCs. Prior to the
intervention, mean reimbursement per prescription had been rising rapidly since 1991 for both
sets of drugs. For targeted drugs, reimbursement per prescription flattened and then declined
sharply after the intervention in 2000. The leveling off before 2000 may reflect an early response
to the intervention, given that the DOJ's planned policy was outlined to Medicaid State Pharmacy
Directors at a national conference in the summer of 1999. 38 The drop in reimbursement per
prescription was not a one-time change, but continued to decline until 2003. This is not
surprising given the gradual adoption of the DOJ recommendations by many states. In contrast,
there was no corresponding break in the reimbursement trend for the competitor NDCs with
average reimbursement continuing to increase through 2004. These two graphs suggest that the
DOJ recommendations had a real impact on actual Medicaid reimbursement trends-- reducing
the price of targeted drugs relative to competitors' prices.
In panel B, trends for the quantity of prescriptions purchased mimic the reimbursement
trends. For targeted and competitor NDCs there are trend reversals following the intervention:
prescriptions declined for targeted NDCs and increased for competitor NDCs. Moreover, the
overall market share of targeted drugs declined after the intervention (Panel C). This is strong
suggestive evidence of a substitution effect. For competitor NDCs, the reversal in trend for
prescriptions (and targeted market share) occurred one year prior to the intervention. We
examine this further in Figure 2 by separately plotting the trends in average annual prescriptions
per NDC for competitor NDCs manufactured by targeted firms and non-targeted firms. Both
trends increased throughout the study period. Nonetheless, the figure also shows a noticeable
uptick in prescriptions in 1999 for competitor NDCs manufactured by targeted firms. One
38

Office of the Attorney General, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, State of New York, 2000.
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possible explanation for this sudden jump in prescriptions is that targeted firms may have
anticipated the intervention and tried to circumvent a loss in market share by shifting sales to
non-targeted products within each drug group. If this uptick represents an anticipatory response
by targeted firms, then measuring the change in prescriptions using 1999 as the base year (as in
Table 2) attenuates the effect of the intervention for competitor drugs.

5.2. Main Regression Results

5.2.1. Reimbursement per Prescription
To estimate the magnitude of the changes in reimbursement per prescription and
prescriptions purchased, we turn to regression analysis. We begin by documenting the impact of
the DOJ intervention on average reimbursement per prescription. If DOJ prices are incorporated
into state reimbursement policies, we would expect to observe a reduction in the actual Medicaid
reimbursement paid per prescription for the targeted NDCs starting in 2000. The differential
impact of the intervention on reimbursement per prescription for targeted NDCs relative to
competitor NDCs is a necessary criteria for identifying the impact of price on pharmacy
purchasing decisions.
We first estimate a non-parametric model to test whether there is a structural break in the
targeted NDC trend relative to the competitor NDC trend around the time of the intervention in
2000:
(2)

The dependent variable is the log of reimbursement per prescription for

in year .

We estimate proportional changes in reimbursement per prescription to allow for comparisons
across drugs with widely different initial reimbursement levels. We control for permanent
differences across NDCs and common year effects with a vector of NDC fixed effects (
vector of year fixed effects ( ), respectively.

and a

is an indicator variable which equals one

for targeted NDCs and zero for competitor NDCs. Standard errors are clustered at the drug group
level 39 to allow for correlation across NDCs within drug groups and serial correlation over time.
39

The drug group is the group of NDCs that share the same drug name.
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The main coefficients of interest are the vector of estimated ’s in which each

gives

the change in the targeted-competitor reimbursement difference between year and the (omitted)
reference year of 1999. These coefficients are reported in Column 1 of Table 3. Targeted and
competitor NDCs appear to have had the same reimbursement trends before the intervention, as
reflected in the statistically insignificant coefficients prior to 2000. However, after states adopted
DOJ prices in 2000, there was a very large and statistically significant relative decline in
reimbursement per prescription for targeted drugs. This differential continued to widen until
2003 and then leveled off. Between 2000 and 2004, the relative reimbursement per prescription
fell by 26% for targeted drugs compared to the 4 year change between 1994 and 1998
.
Based on the results from the non-parametric model, we next parameterize this
specification by imposing a trend break in 2000 and allowing the effect to have a level and slope
shift. This model allows us to estimate an average intervention effect. We also allow targeted and
competitor NDCs to have separate linear trends. The slope shift is motivated by the graphical
evidence in Figure 1 which showed that the drop in the reimbursement per prescription was not a
one-time change but continued to decline over time as more states adopted the DOJ
recommendations. The estimating equation is:

(3)

is an indicator that equals 1 in 2000-2004 and zero in 1994-1999. is a linear time trend
and

equals 1 in 2001, 2 in 2002 and so forth. Standard errors are again clustered at

the drug group level. The intercept shift for targeted NDCs relative to competitor NDCs is
measured by

and the differential slope shift by

. The key identifying assumption is that

reimbursement per prescription for targeted and competitor NDCs would have continued along
the same trends in the absence of the intervention. Combining these coefficients as
gives the estimated effect of the intervention on targeted NDCs through 2004. The results from
estimating Equation 3 are reported in Column 2 of Table 3. There is a statistically significant
differential intercept and slope shift for targeted NDCs after 2000. The intervention appears to
have reduced average reimbursement per prescription by 44% through 2004
22

. This estimate is larger than the non-parametric estimate because the
point-by-point comparison did not account for an intercept shift. 40
In column 3, we examine the robustness of this result to adding linear trends that vary by
drug group

x Target cells. Given the limited statistical power, we do not use NDC-specific

time trends in this analysis -- which would be the most flexible specification. We continue to
constrain the slope and intercept shifts to be the same for all targeted NDCs and for all
competitor NDCs. This model, which adds flexible time trends to Equation 3, is estimated as
follows:
(4)

The results are highly robust to the more flexible specification. The results suggest that
reimbursement per prescription declined by 50% through 2004 for targeted NDCs relative to
competitor NDCs

. Next, as a sensitivity test, we exclude competitor

NDCs whose manufacturers were targeted by the DOJ for other NDCs within the same drug
group -- thus comparing targeted NDCs with competitor NDCs whose firms were not targeted
for other drug products. As discussed earlier, competitor NDCs made by targeted manufacturers
may respond differently to the intervention given the likelihood that they are under heightened
scrutiny and also because they can shift market share between their targeted drugs and their own
non-targeted bioequivalent products. The results in Column 4 show that the intercept shift and
slope shift are slightly larger after excluding these NDCs. The total effect of the intervention on
reimbursement per prescription through 2004 is 54% for targeted NDCs, which is only slightly
larger than the previous estimate using the full sample.
It should be noted that the results presented in this section likely represent lower bound
estimates of the DOJ's impact on reimbursement per prescription for two reasons. First, the
estimates represent aggregate effects. Since not every state adopted DOJ prices or implemented
the full set of recommended changes, the aggregate effect is smaller than the impact on states
that were fully compliant with DOJ recommendations. Second, we can only observe prices for
drug products with positive sales. If the products with the largest price declines were more likely
40

Estimating the intervention effect using only a slope shift results in a 25% decline
in
reimbursement per prescription which is very close to the estimate of 26% from the non-parametric model.
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to be discontinued by manufacturers or generate zero sales, our estimate would understate the
impact of the intervention on reimbursement per prescription since the largest price reductions
are selected out of the sample.

5.2.2. Prescriptions Purchased
Given the substantial differential impact of the DOJ intervention on reimbursement per
prescription for targeted NDCs, we next examine how pharmacy purchasing decisions responded
to this plausibly exogenous price shock. There are three main mechanisms through which the
intervention could have caused changes in the quantity and composition of generic drugs used by
Medicaid beneficiaries. First, pharmacies may have reduced their purchasing of targeted NDCs
(whose relative price declined) and substituted towards competitor NDCs (whose relative price
increased)--thereby lowering the pharmacy market share of targeted drugs. Second, reductions in
reimbursement may have reduced access to these drugs for Medicaid beneficiaries. For example,
manufacturers may respond to reduced demand for their products following the DOJ intervention
by discontinuing production of targeted generic drugs. Consolidation in the number of generic
producers for a given drug may make these products vulnerable to shortages which reduce access
to beneficiaries (Chabner, 2011; Yurukoglu, 2012). The reduced reimbursement may also affect
pharmacies’ decisions to stock and dispense drugs for Medicaid beneficiaries-- a noted concern
by patient groups, which may have prevented some states from adopting DOJ prices (OIG,
2001). This would cause a decline in the total prescriptions dispensed for these drug groups.
Finally, manufacturers may have strategically discontinued products that were targeted
by the DOJ and re-introduced these products (repackaging the drug or modifying the formulation
with a new NDC). If manufacturers introduce a new version of a targeted drug, the product will
be assigned a new NDC code which will not be subject to the price recommendations made by
the DOJ. Thus, manufacturers can circumvent profit loss by discontinuing targeted NDCs and
introducing new, modified versions of these products that would not be targeted by the policy. If
this type of product exit and entry occurred, we would observe a decline in targeted market
share.
In this analysis, we do not attempt to separately identify the relative contribution of each
of these mechanisms to the change in prescription quantities. Instead, we use measures that
summarize the total intervention effect: market share of targeted drugs and total prescriptions
24

purchased in the drug group. In order to capture changes to market share that occur through the
introduction or discontinuation of NDCs, we aggregate the data to drug group-by-year cells.
Again we begin by estimating year effects in a non-parametric model in order to identify trend
breaks in the time series:

(5)

The dependent variable is the market share for targeted drugs, computed as the number of
prescriptions of targeted NDCs in drug group
prescriptions in drug group

in year divided by the total number of

in year . Observations with zero targeted market share are

included. However we exclude any drug group-by-year observations for years in which there are
no sales for both targeted and competitor NDCs in the drug group. This leaves 480 drug groupby-year observations. We control for drug group fixed effects ( ) and include a set of year fixed
effects (

treating 1999 as the reference (omitted) year. We cluster standard errors at the drug

group level.
Column 1 of Table 4 reports the full set of

coefficients which trace out the time pattern

of market share for targeted drugs from 1994-2004 relative to market share in 1999. The negative
coefficients before and after the reference year reflect an increasing trend in targeted market
share during the pre-period and a decreasing trend following the intervention. Although the
change between 1999 and 2000 is not statistically significant, the negative coefficients in 1998
and 2000 suggest that the trend reversal may have begun in 2000 as predicted. The decline in
targeted market share accelerated through 2004. A joint significance test rejects that all of the
negative coefficients following the intervention are equal to zero at the 10% level. Relative to the
4-year change from 1994 to 1998, the intervention led to a statistically significant decline in
targeted market share of 16.1 percentage points from 2000 and 2004 (
=-0.161 with a standard error of 0.058). This suggests that pharmacies
substituted towards the competitor products after the intervention.
Next, we parameterize the effect by estimating a linear trend break model which is
analogous to Equation 3:
(6)
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The results in Column 2 of Table 4 show that there was a statistically significant slope change in
the trend for targeted market share in 2000 and a statistically insignificant intercept shift. The
market share for targeted drugs fell by 18.4 percentage points by 2004

, a 45%

decline relative to the baseline mean of 40.9% in 1999. This is similar to the effect size found in
the non-parametric specification when one considers the pre-existing trend in the average
targeted market share. In Column 3 of Table 4, we add drug group specific linear time trends.
The more flexible specification produces slightly larger effects suggesting that targeted market
share declined by an average of 18.8 percentage points by 2004 (a 46% reduction). 41
In Columns 4 and 5, we decompose the change in competitor drugs' market share by
whether or not the NDCs were manufactured by targeted firms. We re-estimate the most flexible
version of Equation 5 using competitor market shares for targeted firms or non-targeted firms as
the dependent variables. Consistent with the descriptive statistics and visual evidence discussed
earlier, there was a smaller increase in market share for competitor drugs manufactured by
targeted firms (3.0 percentage point increase through 2004 versus 15.9 percentage points). This
may reflect pharmacies reluctance to substitute towards competitor NDCs from the firms that
have a higher chance of being targeted in future DOJ investigations.

5.3 Additional Specifications

5.3.1. Effects for Early Adopter States versus Other States
As discussed in Section 3.1, not all states adopted the DOJ recommendations
immediately. Some states may have adopted the recommendations with a lag or not at all. In
Table 5, we compare the time pattern of reimbursement per prescription and targeted market
share for the 30 states that reported in an OIG survey (2001) that they had incorporated some or
all of the recommended AWP changes as of January-March 2001 (Columns 1 and 3) with all

41

A reasonable next step is to combine the estimate of the effect of the DOJ intervention on price (Column 3 of
Table 3) with the effect on market share (Column 3 of Table 4) to compute an indirect least squares estimate of the
price elasticity of pharmacy demand. This estimate is 0.92 (0.46/0.50), a positive number that is at odds with that of
a standard competitive market in which the lowest priced drugs capture the highest pharmacy market share.
However, this is suggestive since we do not have enough statistical power to precisely estimate this price elasticity.
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other states (Columns 2 and 4). 42 We would expect to find a differential effect for the early
adopter states in the early years after the recommendations were released.
As shown in Columns 1 and 2, the differential decline in reimbursement for targeted
NDCs was much larger for early adopter states during the first few years after the intervention.
Over time, the decline for the two groups of states converged, as more states adopted the
recommendations. This pattern of the timing of the response across states provides more
reassuring evidence of a causal relationship between the DOJ policy and the observed decline in
price.
In Columns 3 and 4, we also compare trends in targeted market share for early adopter
states and all other states. Consistent with the time patterns for reimbursement per prescription,
targeted market share declined earlier and was greater in magnitude for early adopter states. For
the states that hadn't adopted the revisions at the time of the survey in 2001, market share did not
begin to decline until 2003. This mimics the results for reimbursement per prescription, which
showed that reimbursement for targeted NDCs declined primarily in the later years of the postintervention period for the states that hadn't initially adopted the revisions.

5.3.2. Treatment Heterogeneity by Market Characteristics
We next examine heterogeneity in the effects on reimbursement and prescriptions
purchased across the approximately 50 drug markets affected by the DOJ intervention.
Significant variation exists across markets with respect to the initial market share of targeted
drugs, the magnitude of the pre-intervention spread for targeted drugs, and the number of firms
producing competing drug products. In Table 6, we test for heterogeneous effects in log
reimbursement per prescription (Panel A) and targeted market share (Panel B) by interacting the
intercept and slope terms in Equations 4 and 6 with indicators for these market characteristics.
For each of the market characteristics that we consider and for both dependent variables
we run two separate regressions—one for the full sample, and one for a trimmed sample where
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As in our previous specifications, we exclude Arizona which does not provide drug utilization data to Medicaid
and the four states (AL, OH, TN, TX) that the OIG survey (2001) identified as relying on “methods other than the
AWP as its primary reimbursement methodology.” While these four states might appear to provide a natural
“control” group with which to test the effects of the DOJ policy on the other states, these states also may have
incorporated some or all the DOJ prices into their own reimbursement methodologies. For example, there is
documentation suggesting that Texas adopted the DOJ prices in 2000 for the targeted drug products (Texas Office of
the Comptroller, 2003). Because of the uncertainty surrounding the reimbursement policies in these four states, we
exclude them from the analysis.
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we exclude drug groups with targeted market share below 5%, and four drug groups with
targeted market share greater than 95% (three out of the four are 100%). We report results for the
trimmed sample because the responsiveness of these drugs groups to the DOJ intervention is
muted because they are bounded from below or above. 43 Full sample results are reported in even
numbered columns and trimmed sample results are in odd numbered columns.
We begin by repeating the baseline specification results in Column 1 for the full sample,
and then reporting the results for the trimmed sample in column 2. The baseline results are
largely robust to excluding drug groups with the most limited scope for a market share response.
We then report results showing how the treatment effects differ across drug groups with initial
targeted market share above or below the median. In the full sample, for drug groups classified
as above the median, targeted drugs accounted for on average 71% of the market prior to the
intervention, compared to 10% for drug groups classified as below the median. In Columns 3
and 4, we report coefficients for the main slope and intercept terms and the interaction of the
main effects with an indicator for whether the drug group’s initial targeted market share was
above the median. As shown in Panel A of Table 6, drug groups with high or low initial targeted
market share experienced similar proportional reductions in reimbursement per prescription
following the intervention. However, as shown in Panel B, the decline in market share is almost
entirely concentrated among drug groups where targeted drugs initially comprised a larger share
of the market. The coefficient on the slope term interacted with the above median initial targeted
market share is -0.084 and is statistically significant at the 1% level (implying a 58% decline in
targeted market share through 2004 for drug groups above the median), while the main effects,
capturing the responses for below median drug groups, are close to zero and statistically
insignificant. These results can be largely explained by the fact that markets with low initial
targeted market share simply have less scope for decreasing market share.
In Columns 5 and 6, we test for heterogeneity across drug groups which had smaller or
larger spreads. We use the published AWP in the 1999 Red Book and the actual acquisition
price uncovered in the DOJ audit to compute actual spreads for each of the targeted NDCs in the
baseline year. To obtain a prescription-weighted average spread for each drug group, we
simulate total reimbursement for all NDCs in the drug group under the AWP benchmark (i.e.

43

Trimming the sample to exclude drug groups with targeted market share less than 1%-4% and greater than or
equal to 96%-100% produce very similar results. Results are available upon request.
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summing the product of the AWP and number of prescriptions across NDCs) and divide that by
simulated total reimbursement using the actual acquisition price as the benchmark. Then we
interact the slope and intercept terms with an indicator for whether the drug group had an
average spread that was larger than the median (AWP is 3.4 times as large as the acquisition
price). As expected, in both Columns 5 and 6, we find that reductions in reimbursement per
prescription are much greater for drug groups with the largest spreads at baseline. In response to
the differential decline in reimbursement, we find that targeted market share also declined more
for the drug groups with a larger initial spread. The difference between the two subgroups is not
statistically significant in the full sample, but is larger in absolute value and statistically
significant in the trimmed sample. The insignificance of the difference in the full sample appears
to be largely due to a set of low targeted market share drug groups that have limited scope for
downward adjustment. Over a four year period, the difference, as reported in the trimmed sample
in Column 6, amounts to a relative decline of 28 percentage points.
Finally, in the last two columns of Table 6. we compare the treatment effects for drug
markets that are more or less concentrated. We identify the number of manufacturers producing
products in each drug group by counting the number of unique labeler codes, the first 5-digits of
the NDC, in 1999. Drugs produced by an above median number of manufacturers have on
average 24 competing firms, whereas below median drug groups have on average 3 competing
firms. For both the full and trimmed samples, the number of manufacturers producing a drug
does not strongly predict a differential response for reimbursement per prescription.

Similarly,

we do not find a statistically significant differential effect of market concentration on targeted
market share.

5.4 Additional Margins of Adjustment
Thus far we have focused on the substitution effect of the intervention: pharmacies
switching between targeted and competitor drugs. It is worth noting that the inflated AWP prices
of Medicaid prescriptions for targeted drugs prior to the intervention, plus the distortion of
Medicaid prescriptions toward these drugs, implies negative effects on welfare. Tax revenue
must be higher to fund Medicaid reimbursement of these prescriptions at inflated prices, which
results in higher deadweight loss. This suggests that the DOJ intervention increased welfare,
rather than just having served as a neutral transfer from pharmacies to the government. Of
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course, there also are other important margins over which the intervention may have led to
changes in behavior for manufacturers, pharmacies, payers, and consumers, any of which could
have affected overall welfare. A full welfare analysis would require consideration of all of these
margins, which goes beyond the scope of this paper (and, in some cases, beyond the scope of
available data), but represents a potentially fruitful area for future research. Nonetheless, the fact
that we do find large distortions in behavior resulting from inflated AWP pricing does suggest
that there likely were substantial negative effects on welfare. Here we provide preliminary
evidence on the effects of the intervention on three other important margins of adjustment by
manufacturers and pharmacies—access, total spending, and the introduction and discontinuation
of NDCs.

5.4.1. Impacts on Access to Prescription Drugs by Medicaid Beneficiaries
The decline in reimbursement may have reduced access to the targeted drug groups for
Medicaid beneficiaries. For example, pharmacies may have responded to the reduced profit
margins for generic drugs by choosing not to dispense certain targeted drugs to Medicaid
beneficiaries and manufacturers may have discontinued producing some targeted drugs, reducing
the availability of treatments overall.
In Table 7, we provide a preliminary test for these extensive margin effects. In Column
1, we estimate Equation 6 using the log of total prescriptions (i.e. the number of prescriptions for
targeted plus competitor NDCs) in drug group

in year as the dependent variable. This

provides suggestive evidence for whether the intervention reduced Medicaid beneficiaries' access
to DOJ-targeted drug groups. The point estimates of the slope and intercept shift suggests that
the quantity of total prescriptions did fall by a small amount, but the standard errors are large and
we cannot conclude that there was a trend break in access to targeted drug groups for Medicaid
beneficiaries after the intervention. This is consistent with the graphical evidence presented in
Appendix Figure A.2 (Panel A) which also does not show a clear trend break in total
prescriptions.

5.4.2. Strategic Product Introduction and Discontinuation
Next, we consider another supply-side mechanism through which we may observe
substitution between targeted and competitor drugs following the intervention. Manufacturers of
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targeted NDCs may have strategically responded to the DOJ targeting by introducing and
marketing new products with new NDC codes that are close substitutes of their targeted NDCs.
For example, one way that manufacturers could strategically respond to the intervention is by reintroducing targeted products with new package sizes. Since the last two digits of the NDC code
determine the package size, these new products will be assigned new NDCs and would not be
subject to DOJ pricing recommendations. Manufacturers could then set new AWPs for these
NDCs in any way they desire. For the purposes of this analysis, such new products are classified
as “competitor NDCs.”
Introducing new products is costly for manufacturers as it requires obtaining necessary
FDA approvals, shifting production resources, and marketing to generate pharmacy market share
for the newly re-packaged or re-formulated products. Even if new products are bioequivalent to
the targeted versions and there is no impact on the overall availability of drugs for Medicaid
beneficiaries, proliferation of these newly introduced substitute NDCs may have welfare
implications. If the prices of the new products are greater than the DOJ-recommended prices of
their targeted counterparts, the strategic introduction of NDCs undoes some of the potential costsavings to the Medicaid program of the policy change and, at the same time, leads to higher
profit margins for pharmacies and/or manufacturers (and presumably increased deadweight loss
from increased taxes to fund higher Medicaid reimbursements). Thus, the overall welfare
implications arising from a reimbursement policy that leads to strategic product substitution are
likely to be negative.
In Table 8, we report the results from specifications that examine whether there were
strategic entry and exit decisions caused by the DOJ policy. We note at the outset that our
empirical “test” is simplistic; a more formal analysis would require simultaneous modeling of
product entry and exit decisions, consideration of product differentiation at the drug class level,
and other considerations typical of comprehensive industry studies. Therefore, we consider these
findings suggestive but not definitive.
If manufacturers of targeted NDCs strategically introduced new NDCs to replace their
targeted NDCs, we would observe an uptick in the fraction of new competitor NDCs produced
by targeted firms in drug groups that had a targeted NDC relative to the fraction of new
competitor NDCs produced by non-targeted firms. 44 To examine whether this occurred, we first
44

This assumes non-targeted firms’ incentives to introduce new NDCs were not affected by the DOJ intervention.
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calculate for each drug group the stock of competitor NDCs with positive sales that were
produced by targeted firms and non-targeted firms in an early base year, 1995, well before the
DOJ intervention, and in a later base year, 1999, right before the DOJ intervention. We then
calculate the ratio of the number of new NDC entrants in each drug group 45 over the subsequent
three years (1996-1998 or 2000-2002) divided by the stock of NDCs in the corresponding base
period. 46 We then average these rates of entry in each time period across drug groups for targeted
and non-targeted firms separately.
As shown in the first row of Panel A in Table 8, there was an average 47% increase in the
total number of NDCs produced by targeted firms in the early time period (between 1996 and
1998) due to entry. The rate of introduction fell to 12% for the time period between 2000 and
2002 (relative to the stock in 1999) following the DOJ policy. This decrease may have arisen for
many reasons, including natural product life cycles that had nothing to do with the DOJ policy.
Because of that, in the second row of Panel A, we similarly compute the change in the rate of
NDC introduction for non-targeted firms, in order to construct a basic difference-in-difference
estimate of strategic product entry decisions by targeted firms relative to non-targeted firms. As
shown in the second row, non-targeted firms also slowed their rate of new product entry in these
drug groups and by an even greater amount, from 86% to 29%. The difference-in-difference
estimate of 22 percentage points suggests that the rate of introduction increased after the
intervention for targeted firms relative to non-targeted firms, but it is not statistically
significant. 47 Moreover, the fact that the rates of new product introduction were so different for
targeted versus competitor firms before the DOJ policy may suggest the potential for differential
trends, which we have not accounted for here. Nonetheless, we find the large point estimate of
strategic entry suggestive enough to warrant future research. With respect to policy design, it is
critical to understand whether a Medicaid policy that targets specific drug products to constrain
costs causes other distortions to unregulated drug products (i.e. proliferation of new unregulated

45

An NDC is considered an entrant in the first year that they are observed with positive Medicaid sales.
We use the number of NDCs in the two base periods as the denominators, rather than the total number of NDCs
during the two three-year periods we examine in order to abstract from product exits that could have occurred
simultaneous to introductions.
47
Measured in proportional terms the declines were similar and actually slightly larger for targeted firms (74 percent
versus 67 percent). Indeed, given the baseline entry rate for targeted firms of 47.3 percent, it would not have been
possible for their entry rates to decline by 56.9 percentage points as they did for competitor firms.
46
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versions of targeted products) in order to mitigate the costs of these constraints (see also Duggan
and Scott-Morton, 2006). 48
In Panel B of Table 8, we report results from a similar analysis for product exit during the
periods pre- and post-DOJ policy. The first row of panel B reports that, on average, 7 percent of
competitor NDCs produced by targeted firms exited prior to the DOJ policy, and that the rate of
exit increased appreciably, to 17 percent after the policy. The second row of Panel B reports that
the rate of exit for products produced by competitor firms also increased between the cohorts,
from 23 percent to 38 percent. The difference-in-difference estimate suggests that the change in
the rate of exit was 6 percentage points lower for targeted firms than competitor firms, though
this result is not statistically significant. The point estimates are consistent with the possibility
that firms that produced targeted NDCs may have chosen to keep other competitor products in
the same drug class on the market longer than they would have otherwise, substituting marketing
and production efforts away from their DOJ-targeted products. 49
While the results of strategic introduction and discontinuation by targeted firms as a
result of the DOJ policy are not conclusive statistically, we find the point estimates suggestive
enough to warrant more investigation in future research.

5.4.3. Effects on Total Medicaid Spending
Finally, we consider preliminary evidence of the net effect of drug product substitution,
introduction, and discontinuation on total Medicaid reimbursement following the DOJ
intervention. In Table 7 (Column 2), we estimate an interrupted time series specification as in
Equation 6. The dependent variable is the log of total reimbursement (i.e. the total
reimbursement for targeted and competitor NDCs) in drug group

in year and we include

indicators for intercept and slope shifts, drug group fixed effects, and drug group-specific linear
trends. While we cannot rule out other shocks to reimbursement during this time period, there
was a statistically significant break in the reimbursement trend after the intervention, which is
also apparent graphically in Appendix Figure A.2 (Panel B). If this entire change was due to the
adoption of new DOJ prices, then the intervention would have generated on average a 40%
48

This response is known as “multi-tasking” in other contexts (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) and is likely to be
an issue for any targeted approach to cost containment.
49
Targeted firms may have discontinued targeted drugs more frequently or more rapidly than otherwise also as a
result of the policy. By definition, no targeted drugs were discontinued prior to 2000, but between 2000 and 2002, 6
percent were discontinued.

33

reduction in total Medicaid reimbursement for the drug groups affected
by the policy. This effect combines: 1) the mechanical effect of a reduction in reimbursement
for targeted drugs with 2) substitution towards competitor drugs whose absolute prices were on
average less than the initial prices paid for targeted drugs even after their prices increased.

6. Conclusion
Current Medicaid procurement rules generate perverse incentives for pharmacies to
purchase and stock the highest-priced generic drugs. Consequently, manufacturers of generic
drugs may compete for pharmacy market share by perversely bidding up the price on which
Medicaid reimbursement is based. The DOJ recommendations to reduce the AWP for
approximately 400 drug products provides an opportunity to study the impact of Medicaid
procurement on generic drug price competition.
We find that Medicaid reimbursement per prescription declined substantially for targeted
drugs following the DOJ intervention. In response to this negative price shock, pharmacies
reduced their demand for targeted drugs and increased their demand for competitor drugs.
Overall, the Medicaid market share for targeted drugs fell by about 45% through 2004. We also
observe a differential decline in price and market share across states, which is consistent with the
time pattern of adoption of the DOJ recommendations. Further, we find larger market share
responses for drug groups in which targeted drugs had higher spreads and larger market share in
the pre-intervention period as predicted. Taken together this evidence suggests that pharmacies
substitute away from low priced generic drugs towards high priced drugs when making
purchasing decisions. This demand response, while consistent with profit-maximizing behavior,
is inconsistent with a typical competitive market in which the lowest-priced drugs capture the
highest market share. This distortion has significant consequences for pharmaceutical spending.
Finally, we also examine whether the policy-induced reduction in Medicaid
reimbursement affected Medicaid recipients’ access to prescriptions or other supply side
responses by manufacturers. Our results on access to drugs in targeted drug groups are
inconclusive, but we do find suggestive evidence that manufacturers engaged in strategic product
introductions and discontinuations that likely mitigated the profit loss induced by the policy.
The Affordable Care Act will significantly expand Medicaid enrollment and drug
spending under this program, making the need for well-designed procurement rules that
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constrain distortionary behaviors and excessive spending even more critical in the near future.
Despite calls for Medicaid payment reform, 50 numerous AWP lawsuits, and several proposed
changes to drug procurement rules, the AWP is still used as the primary reimbursement
benchmark in the majority of state Medicaid programs. The persistence of the AWP reflects the
significant challenges of designing alternative procurement policies that both limit distortions to
market outcomes and that are feasible to implement.

50

For example, see “Medicaid Prescription Drug Reimbursement: Why the Government Pays Too Much,” House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 108th Congress (2004).
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Figure 1- Trends in Reimbursement per Prescription and Prescriptions Purchased, 19912004
Panel A: Mean Reimbursement per Prescription for Targeted and Competitor NDCs

Panel B: Mean Number of Prescriptions for Targeted and Competitor NDCs

Panel C: Mean Targeted Market Share at the Drug Group Level

Notes: Figure 1 plots raw means of reimbursement per prescription and number of prescriptions using NDC-level
data and mean targeted market share using drug group level data. Means for NDCs that were targeted by the DOJ
and their competitor NDCs are plotted separately. Sample restrictions are described in section 4.2.
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Figure 2 – Trends in Prescriptions for Competitor NDCs, Targeted Firms vs. Non-Targeted
Firms

Notes: Figure 2 plots raw means of the number of prescriptions using NDC-level data for “competitor” NDCs.
Means are plotted separately for competitor NDCs that were manufactured by firms whose other products in the
drug group had been targeted by the DOJ with competitor NDCs that were manufactured by firms whose products
were not at all targeted in the drug group. The sample excludes data from the five states that do not use the AWP as
their primary reimbursement methodology, hemophilia drugs, and outliers as described in the text in section 4.2.
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Table 1 – Illustration of Margins between Published AWPs and DOJ-Audited Actual
Average Wholesale Prices for Select NDCs
Generic Name
ACETYLCYSTEINE
ACYCLOVIR SODIUM
ALBUTEROL SULFATE
CIMETIDINE HYDROCHLORIDE
CLINDAMYCIN PHOSPHATE
FUROSEMIDE
LORAZEPAM
LUPRON
VANCOMYCIN HYDROCHLORIDE
ZOFRAN

NDC
49502-0182-30
63323-0325-20
49502-0697-60
00074-7444-01
00009-0728-09
00074-6102-04
00074-1985-10
00300-3629-01
00205-3154-15
00173-0461-00

Product Description
20%, 30 ml, 3s
50 mg/ml, 20 ml
0.083%, 3 ml, 60s
150 mg/ml, 2 ml, 10s
150 mg/ml, 60 ml, 5s
10 mg/ml, 4 ml, 25s
2 mg/ml, 10 ml
7.5 mg, ea (PDS)
1 gm, 10s, ea
32 mg/50 ml, 50 ml

AWP in 1999 DOJ Average
(Red Book) Wholesale Price
133.43
50.64
42.59
28.00
72.60
22.01
86.69
11.72
905.88
259.20
122.02
20.28
86.81
25.83
594.65
482.52
109.39
9.02
206.41
128.09

Notes: The source for the AWP is the 1999 Red Book; the source for the actual average wholesale price uncovered
in the DOJ audit is obtained from a Program Memorandum issued by the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS, 2000). For each generic or off-patent drug shown in the table, the NDC selected represents approximately
the median spread (ratio of Red Book AWP to DOJ average wholesale price) for that drug group.
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Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics, 1999-2002
Targeted NDCs

Sample:
Reimbursement per Prescription, 1999
Change in Reimbursement per Prescription, 1999-2002

(1)
232.61
-42.13

Number of Prescriptions, 1999
Change in Number of Prescriptions, 1999-2002

Competitor NDCs
Targeted Non-Targeted
Firms
Firms
All
(2)
(3)
(4)
73.86
166.67
50.49
10.72
-16.66
12.73

7,994.12
-358.17

6,699.91
2,803.16

7,288.44
37.15

6,551.67
3,662.51

NDC Market Share, 1999
Change in NDC Market Share, 1999-2002

0.050
0.001

0.009
0.002

0.011
0.001

0.009
0.002

Drug Group Market Share, 1999*
Change in Drug Group Market Share, 1999-2002

0.409
-0.011

0.635
-0.018

0.188
0.004

0.566
-0.032

Fraction Generic, 1999
Year of FDA Approval, 1999
Fraction Unit Type, 1999:
ML
Gram
Capsule
Tablet
Other

0.670
1991.3

0.787
1989.6

0.639
1990.7

0.841
1989.2

0.737
0.024
0.000
0.000
0.239

0.466
0.046
0.023
0.374
0.091

0.763
0.029
0.016
0.110
0.082

0.358
0.053
0.025
0.470
0.094

Total Prescriptions, 1999
2,869,890
18,980,848 4,154,410
14,826,438
Total Reimbursement, 1999
155,787,680 389,058,079 107,581,483 281,476,595
NDC x Year Observations, 1999
359
2,833
570
2,263
Notes: Variable means are reported using NDC-level data with the exception of drug group market share*, which
uses drug group-level data. The sample excludes data from the five states that do not use the AWP as their primary
reimbursement methodology, hemophilia drugs, and outliers as described in the text in section 4.2.
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Table 3— Effects of DOJ Intervention on Reimbursement per Prescription, 1994-2004
Dependent variable:

Log (Reimbursement per Prescription)
(1)

Target*Post*(t-2000)
Target*Post
Target*Year1994
Target*Year1995
Target*Year1996
Target*Year1997
Target*Year1998
Target*Year2000
Target*Year2001
Target*Year2002
Target*Year2003
Target*Year2004
Year FE
NDC FE
Drug Group x Target x t
Excl. Targeted Firms
F-test
NDC x Year Obs

0.109
(0.139)
0.025
(0.120)
0.100
(0.122)
0.127
(0.107)
0.059
(0.048)
-0.175***
(0.039)
-0.421***
(0.076)
-0.525***
(0.087)
-0.543***
(0.088)
-0.528***
(0.090)
Y
Y
N
N
11.390
[0.000]
32,203

(2)
-0.071*
(0.041)
-0.292***
(0.055)

(3)
-0.092**
(0.038)
-0.325***
(0.052)

(4)
-0.110**
(0.047)
-0.343***
(0.061)

Y
Y
N
N

Y
Y
Y
N

Y
Y
Y
Y

32,203

32,203

26,899

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the drug group level. Column 1 reports results
from estimating equation 2 using NDC-level data and Columns 2-4 report results from estimating equation 3 and 4.
Column 2 also includes a linear time trend interacted with Target which is not reported. Column 3 adds Drug Group
x Target specific linear trends, and Column 4 excludes observations from “competitor” NDCs manufactured by
targeted firms. The F-test tests the joint significance of Target*Year2000 through Target*Year2004 (p-value in
brackets). Sample restrictions are described in section 4.2.
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Table 4 – Effects of DOJ Intervention on Prescriptions Purchased, 1994-2004
Dependent variable:

Targeted Market Share

(1)
Post*(t-2000)
Post
Year1994
Year1995
Year1996
Year1997
Year1998
Year2000
Year2001
Year2002
Year2003
Year2004
Drug Group FE
Drug Group x t
F-test
Mean Dependent
Variable (1999)
Observations

-0.110**
(0.050)
-0.080*
(0.046)
-0.052
(0.041)
-0.014
(0.027)
-0.001
(0.023)
-0.006
(0.017)
-0.015
(0.023)
-0.011
(0.028)
-0.039
(0.033)
-0.058
(0.041)
Y
N
2.230
[0.068]
0.409
480

Competitor Market Share
Targeted Non-Targeted
Firms
Firms
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.036** -0.037**
0.002
0.035**
(0.014) (0.015)
(0.010)
(0.016)
-0.04
-0.04
0.022
0.019
(0.027) (0.029)
(0.018)
(0.024)

Y
N

480

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

480

0.141
480

0.450
480

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the drug group level. Column 1 reports results
from estimating equation 5 using drug group-level data and Columns 2 and 3 report results from estimating equation
6. Column 2 is estimated at the drug group level and includes a linear time trend whose coefficient is not reported.
Column 3 adds drug group specific linear trends. Columns 4 and 5 report results using the market share of
competitor drugs (for targeted firms or non-targeted firms) as the dependent variable. The F-test tests the joint
significance of Year2000 through Year2004 (p-value in brackets). Sample restrictions are described in section 4.2.
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Table 5 – Early Adopter States versus All Other States

Dependent variable:

Target*Year1994
Target*Year1995
Target*Year1996
Target*Year1997
Target*Year1998
Target*Year2000
Target*Year2001
Target*Year2002
Target*Year2003
Target*Year2004
Year FE
NDC FE
Drug Group x Target x t
F-test

Log (Reimbursement per
Prescription)
Early Adopter
States
(1)
0.124
(0.140)
0.089
(0.128)
0.101
(0.127)
0.128
(0.105)
0.047
(0.043)
-0.310***
(0.060)
-0.660***
(0.112)
-0.630***
(0.111)
-0.583***
(0.099)
-0.548***
(0.100)
Y
Y
N
7.800
[0.000]

Targeted Market Share

All Other
States
(2)
-0.018
(0.148)
-0.039
(0.148)
0.024
(0.134)
0.081
(0.125)
0.008
(0.063)
-0.099**
(0.046)
-0.215***
(0.057)
-0.437***
(0.090)
-0.484***
(0.102)
-0.507***
(0.108)
Y
Y
N
10.420
[0.000]

Year1994
Year1995
Year1996
Year1997
Year1998
Year2000
Year2001
Year2002
Year2003
Year2004
Drug Group FE
Drug Group x t
F-test

Early Adopter
States
(3)
-0.117**
(0.051)
-0.084*
(0.047)
-0.056
(0.041)
-0.018
(0.027)
-0.007
(0.021)
-0.021
(0.021)
-0.039
(0.026)
-0.047
(0.031)
-0.062*
(0.034)
-0.088**
(0.040)
Y
N

All Other
States
(4)
-0.095*
(0.050)
-0.071
(0.047)
-0.042
(0.042)
-0.015
(0.032)
0.01
(0.025)
0.008
(0.017)
0.021
(0.024)
0.033
(0.030)
-0.011
(0.039)
-0.025
(0.046)
Y
N

1.460
[0.223]

1.980
[0.101]

480
480
NDC x Year Obs
29,038
29,254 Drug Group x Year Obs
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the drug group level. Columns 1 and 3 report
non-parametric results from the 30 states that reported in an OIG survey that they had incorporated AWP changes as
of January-March 2001. Columns 2 and 3 report results for all other states. Sample restrictions are described in
section 4.2.
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Table 6 – Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Targeted Market Share Targeted Spread in Number of Firms in
in Drug Group (1999) Drug Group (1999) Drug Group (1999)
Baseline
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Panel A: Log (Reimbursement per Prescription)
-0.102* -0.105** -0.119**
Target*Post*(t-2000)
-0.092**-0.101*** -0.102*** -0.113*** -0.09
(0.035) (0.030)
(0.033)
(0.032) (0.059) (0.057)
(0.048) (0.043)
Target*Post
-0.325***-0.288*** -0.387*** -0.387*** -0.114*
-0.07 -0.324*** -0.276**
(0.048) (0.055)
(0.049)
(0.060) (0.066) (0.091)
(0.092) (0.102)
Target*Post*(t-2000)*I(>Median)
0.016
0.017
-0.003
0.000
0.026
0.036
(0.041)
(0.045) (0.055) (0.062)
(0.041) (0.044)
Target*Post*I(>Median)
0.106
0.148 -0.294*** -0.305*** 0.000
-0.021
(0.100)
(0.114) (0.079) (0.100)
(0.106) (0.124)
Trimmed (Excl. Targeted Mkt Share
<5% & >95%)
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
NDC x Year Obs
32,203 15,758
32,203
15,758
32,060
15,725
32,203
15,758
Panel B: Targeted Market Share
0.004
0.006
-0.031
-0.014
-0.045
-0.032
Post*(t-2000)
-0.037** -0.040**
(0.015) (0.019)
(0.015)
(0.027) (0.024) (0.024)
(0.028) (0.031)
Post
-0.04
-0.046
0.011
0.009
-0.05
-0.033
-0.078
-0.075
(0.029) (0.039)
(0.028)
(0.051) (0.046) (0.053)
(0.052) (0.061)
Post*(t-2000)*I(>Median)
-0.084*** -0.077** -0.02
-0.069*
0.015
-0.02
(0.026)
(0.035) (0.030) (0.034)
(0.030) (0.034)
Post*I(>Median)
-0.106*
-0.091
0.025
-0.006
0.074
0.068
(0.055)
(0.074) (0.057) (0.077)
(0.056) (0.072)
Trimmed (Excl. Targeted Mkt Share
<5% & >95%)
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Drug Group x Year Obs
480
330
480
330
458
319
480
330
Mean Targeted Mean No. of Firms
Mean Targeted Mkt
Spread (1999)
(1999)
Share (1999)
<=Median:
0.10
2.21
2.95
>Median:
0.71
27.43
24.41
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the drug group level. Panel A includes drug
group fixed effects, year fixed effects, and drug group x target linear trends. Panel B includes drug group fixed
effects and drug group specific linear trends. Columns 1 and 2 are copied from Tables 3 and 4. Columns 3-8 interact
the slope and intercept terms of the baseline specification with an indicator for drug group characteristics: 1)
whether the drug group had above median targeted market share in 1999 (Cols 3 and 4), 2) whether the drug group
had above median average spread for targeted drugs in 1999 (Cols 5 and 6), 3) whether the drug group had above
median number of competitor firms in 1999 (Cols 7 and 8). Sample restrictions are described in section 4.2.
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Table 7 – Effect on Access to Prescription Drugs and Total Spending
Dependent Variable:
Post*(t-2000)
Post
Drug Group FE
Drug Group x t
Observations

Log (Total Prescriptions)
(1)

Log (Total Reimbursement)
(2)

-0.034
(0.035)
-0.007
(0.061)
Y
Y
480

-0.124**
(0.051)
-0.008
(0.122)
Y
Y
480

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the drug group level. Sample restrictions are
described in section 4.2.
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Table 8 – Effects on Introduction and Discontinuation of Competitor NDCs, Targeted
Firms vs. Non-Targeted Firms

Sample: Competitor NDCs
Panel A: Rate of NDC Introduction
Targeted Firms
Non-Targeted Firms

Pre-DOJ
Intervention
(1)

Post-DOJ
Intervention
(2)

0.473
(0.207)
0.856
(0.307)

0.123
(0.036)
0.287
(0.065)

-0.350*
(0.207)
-0.569*
(0.302)
0.219
(0.366)

0.072
(0.025)
0.233
(0.052)

0.166
(0.042)
0.384
(0.066)

0.094**
(0.046)
0.150*
(0.083)
-0.056
(0.091)

Difference-in-Difference

Panel B: Rate of NDC Discontinuation
Targeted Firms
Non-Targeted Firms
Difference-in-Difference

Difference
(3)

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the drug-group level. Each observation in the
regression is a drug group x targeted firm cell. For the introduction results (Panel A), each cell in Column 1 reports
the average (across drug groups) of the ratio of the number of NDCs in each drug group that entered in 1996-1998
(pre-DOJ intervention) divided by the number of NDCs with positive sales in the drug group in 1995 (separately for
NDCs produced by targeted and non-targeted firms). Column 2 reports the average ratio of the number of NDCs in
a drug group that entered in 2000-2000 divided by the baseline stock, using 1999 as the base year. The
discontinuation results (Panel B) are reported similarly. Sample restrictions are described in section 4.2. N=131.
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Appendix A
Figure A.1 – Illustration of DOJ Intervention for Acetylcysteine
Drug Group: Acetylcysteine
NDC
Product Description
00074-3307-01
ACETYLCYSTEINE 10%
00074-3307-02
ACETYLCYSTEINE 10%
00074-3307-03
ACETYLCYSTEINE 10%
00074-3308-01
ACETYLCYSTEINE 20%
00074-3308-02
ACETYLCYSTEINE 20%
00074-3308-03
ACETYLCYSTEINE 20%
55390-0211-03
ACETYLCYSTEINE 10%
55390-0212-03
ACETYLCYSTEINE 10%
55390-0213-03
ACETYLCYSTEINE 20%
55390-0214-03
ACETYLCYSTEINE 20%
61703-0203-04
ACETYLCYSTEINE 10%
61703-0203-31
ACETYLCYSTEINE 10%
61703-0204-04
ACETYLCYSTEINE 20%
61703-0204-31
ACETYLCYSTEINE 20%
And Other NDCs…

VIAL
VIAL
VIAL
VIAL
VIAL
VIAL
VIAL
VIAL
VIAL
VIAL
VIAL
VIAL
VIAL
VIAL

Manufacturer
Abbott (generic)
Abbott (generic)
Abbott (generic)
Abbott (generic)
Abbott (generic)
Abbott (generic)
Bedford (generic)
Bedford (generic)
Bedford (generic)
Bedford (generic)
Faulding (generic)
Faulding (generic)
Faulding (generic)
Faulding (generic)

Targeted by DOJ?
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y

Notes: This figure illustrates the DOJ intervention described in Section 3.1 for selected NDCs within the drug group
Acetylcysteine. Only a few NDCs produced by Abbott were targeted by the DOJ, all NDCs produced by Faulding
were targeted, and no NDCs produced by Bedford were targeted. The DOJ recommended that states lower
Medicaid reimbursement from the AWP to the audited price for targeted NDCs within the group of bioequivalent
NDCs. Following the intervention, the market share for the Acetylcysteine NDCs targeted by the DOJ declined
sharply. Approximately 50 drug groups had at least one NDC targeted by the DOJ, with about 400 NDCs targeted
overall.
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Figure A.2 – Trends in Access to Prescription Drugs and Total Spending for Targeted
Drug Groups, 1991-2004
Panel A: Log Total Prescriptions

9.8

Log(Total Prescriptions)
10.2
10.4
10

10.6

Targeted Drug Groups

1991

1993

1995

1997
year

1999

2001

2003

2001

2003

Panel B: Log Total Reimbursement

13.5

Log(Total Reimbursement)
14
14.5
15

15.5

Targeted Drug Groups

1991

1993

1995

1997
year

1999

Notes: This figure plots raw means of log total number of prescriptions and log total reimbursement using drug
group level data. This is the graphical analog to the regressions in Table 7. Sample restrictions are described in
section 4.2.
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Table A.1 – Descriptive Statistics for Generic Drug Groups Targeted by the DOJ,
1999

Generic Drug Group
ALBUTEROL SULFATE
ALBUTEROL SULFATE
FACTOR VIII
FACTOR VIII
LORAZEPAM
LORAZEPAM
FUROSEMIDE
FUROSEMIDE
SODIUM CHLORIDE
SODIUM CHLORIDE
CROMOLYN SODIUM
CROMOLYN SODIUM
ZOFRAN
ZOFRAN
IMMUNE GLOBULIN
IMMUNE GLOBULIN
FACTOR IX
TOBRAMYCIN SULFATE
TOBRAMYCIN SULFATE
ACYCLOVIR SODIUM
ACYCLOVIR SODIUM
LUPRON
LUPRON
CLINDAMYCIN PHOSPHATE
CLINDAMYCIN PHOSPHATE
VANCOMYCIN HYDROCHLORIDE
VANCOMYCIN HYDROCHLORIDE
CIMETIDINE HYDROCHLORIDE
CIMETIDINE HYDROCHLORIDE
DIAZEPAM
DIAZEPAM
CALCITRIOL
CALCITRIOL
METHOTREXATE SODIUM
METHOTREXATE SODIUM
KYTRIL
KYTRIL
DEXTROSE
DEXTROSE
AMPHOTERICIN B
AMPHOTERICIN B
HEPARIN LOCK FLUSH
HEPARIN LOCK FLUSH
METAPROTERENOL SULFATE
METAPROTERENOL SULFATE
GENTAMICIN SULFATE
GENTAMICIN SULFATE
WINRHO SDF
LEUCOVORIN CALCIUM
LEUCOVORIN CALCIUM
ANZEMET/DOLASETRON MESYLATE
ANZEMET/DOLASETRON MESYLATE
CYCLOPHOSPHAMIDE
CYCLOPHOSPHAMIDE
DOXORUBICIN HYDROCHLORIDE
DOXORUBICIN HYDROCHLORIDE

Mean
Total Medicaid
Total Reimbursement
Reimbursement Total Number of Amount for Drug
Targeted by Reimbursement
per Prescription Amount ($1000s)
Group ($1000s)
DOJ?
Prescriptions
N
17.4
87,179
5,560,183
146,139
Y
32.2
58,960
1,976,543
146,139
N
13036.1
951
40
97,551
Y
10493.2
96,600
9,697
97,551
N
36.0
79,891
2,468,956
81,076
Y
76.9
1,185
26,785
81,076
N
8.4
33,289
6,188,582
33,478
Y
19.8
190
8,977
33,478
N
35.0
17,917
650,140
27,337
Y
72.3
9,421
141,677
27,337
N
53.0
14,172
227,836
25,917
Y
55.2
11,746
225,219
25,917
N
416.9
20,641
45,407
24,882
Y
331.8
4,240
30,931
24,882
N
1323.3
2,335
4,179
24,284
Y
1981.5
21,949
10,743
24,284
Y
10159.7
18,621
1,744
18,621
N
189.2
17,132
172,124
18,081
Y
261.7
949
3,707
18,081
N
75.4
16,681
366,494
16,957
Y
734.3
277
1,161
16,957
N
1209.6
7,153
9,819
15,871
Y
1160.1
8,718
12,380
15,871
N
53.5
13,040
324,187
13,462
Y
150.7
422
3,337
13,462
N
184.4
3,474
16,676
13,365
Y
194.3
9,892
45,095
13,365
N
21.2
11,690
664,202
11,706
Y
45.6
16
521
11,706
N
24.2
11,119
1,083,068
11,141
Y
15.2
22
1,331
11,141
N
97.4
8,906
136,094
9,263
Y
290.1
358
24,056
9,263
N
38.2
9,014
173,751
9,261
Y
17.4
247
20,216
9,261
N
606.3
4,206
7,812
6,780
Y
786.5
2,575
12,653
6,780
N
57.6
483
9,476
6,246
Y
70.2
5,764
105,501
6,246
N
839.2
5,253
5,400
6,027
Y
120.6
774
2,634
6,027
N
39.7
3,665
139,014
4,506
Y
15.1
841
62,470
4,506
N
26.7
3,365
134,173
4,181
Y
55.1
816
12,522
4,181
N
17.6
3,639
340,752
3,737
Y
28.0
98
4,477
3,737
Y
2080.4
3,696
3,162
3,696
N
166.3
2,536
21,744
3,256
Y
322.1
720
3,039
3,256
N
658.8
779
1,349
3,007
Y
341.4
2,227
49,613
3,007
N
123.8
1,348
8,444
2,690
Y
930.0
1,342
4,092
2,690
N
703.1
721
703
2,461
Y
356.0
1,740
4,641
2,461
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Mean
Total Medicaid
Total Reimbursement
Reimbursement Total Number of Amount for Drug
Targeted by Reimbursement
per Prescription Amount ($1000s)
Group ($1000s)
DOJ?
Prescriptions
Generic Drug Group
ACETYLCYSTEINE
N
72.5
874
12,852
2,081
ACETYLCYSTEINE
Y
76.9
1,207
15,538
2,081
ETOPOSIDE
N
617.7
1,725
2,488
2,074
ETOPOSIDE
Y
326.5
349
1,064
2,074
DEXAMETHASONE
N
14.6
2,025
144,932
2,063
DEXAMETHASONE
Y
15.0
38
2,731
2,063
IRON DEXTRAN
N
127.4
317
2,614
1,898
IRON DEXTRAN
Y
165.1
1,581
11,768
1,898
CISPLATIN
N
614.0
1,160
1,976
1,160
CISPLATIN
Y
720.8
1
1
1,160
AMIKACIN SULFATE
N
329.2
288
739
1,146
AMIKACIN SULFATE
Y
389.1
859
3,100
1,146
FLUOROURACIL
N
61.5
1,090
15,166
1,139
FLUOROURACIL
Y
27.5
50
3,338
1,139
METHYLPREDNISOLONE SODIUM SUCCINATE
N
32.6
640
23,669
1,064
METHYLPREDNISOLONE SODIUM SUCCINATE
Y
51.8
424
9,749
1,064
TESTOSTERONE CYPIONATE
N
41.3
51
1,286
938
TESTOSTERONE CYPIONATE
Y
50.6
887
15,208
938
PENTAMIDINE ISETHIONATE
N
165.4
629
5,647
816
PENTAMIDINE ISETHIONATE
Y
203.4
188
1,099
816
ANTI-INHIBITOR COAGULANT COMPLEX
N
9135.9
62
12
743
ANTI-INHIBITOR COAGULANT COMPLEX
Y
16368.5
680
51
743
BLEOMYCIN SULFATE
Y
713.5
684
791
684
TESTOSTERONE ENANTHATE
N
57.0
438
6,268
452
TESTOSTERONE ENANTHATE
Y
27.8
14
503
452
VINCRISTINE SULFATE
N
77.8
48
644
150
VINCRISTINE SULFATE
Y
59.8
101
1,887
150
MITOMYCIN
N
430.8
103
163
148
MITOMYCIN
Y
535.0
45
93
148
HYDROCORTISONE SODIUM SUCCINATE
N
23.3
35
1,668
99
HYDROCORTISONE SODIUM SUCCINATE
Y
23.8
65
3,281
99
CYTARABINE
Y
95.7
76
1,188
76
VINBLASTINE SULFATE
N
135.6
12
171
48
VINBLASTINE SULFATE
Y
51.3
36
1,068
48

Notes: The sample excludes data from the five states that do not use the AWP as their primary reimbursement
methodology and outliers as described in the text in section 4.2.
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